361 research outputs found
Fatalism and Future Contingents
In this paper I address issues related to the problem of future contingents and
the metaphysical doctrine of fatalism. Two classical responses to the problem of
future contingents are the third truth value view and the all-false view. According to
the former, future contingents take a third truth value which goes beyond truth and
falsity. According to the latter, they are all false. I here illustrate and discuss two
ways to respectively argue for those two views. Both ways are similar in spirit and
intimately connected with fatalism, in the sense that they engage with the doctrine
of fatalism and accept a large part of a standard fatalistic machinery
Determinism and inevitability
In Freedom Evolves, Dan Dennett embarks on his second book-length attempt to lay to rest the deep metaphysical concerns that many philosophers have expressed about the possibility of human freedom.One of his main objectives in the earlier chapters of the book is to make determinism appear less threatening to our prospects for free agency than it has sometimes seemed, by attempting to show that a deterministic universe would not necessarily be a universe of which it could truly be said that everything that occurs in it is inevitable. In this paper, I want to consider Dennettâs striking argument for this conclusion in some detail. I shall begin by suggesting that on its most natural interpretation, the argument is vulnerable to a serious objection. I shall then develop a second interpretation which is more promising than the first, but will argue that without placing more weight on etymological considerations than they can really bear, it can deliver, at best, only a significantly qualified version of the conclusion that Dennett is seeking. However, although I shall be arguing that his central argument fails, it is also part of the purpose of this paper to build on what I regard as some rather insightful and suggestive material which is developed by Dennett in the course of elaborating his views. His own development of these ideas is hampered, so I shall argue, by a framework for thinking about possibility that is too crude to accommodate the immense subtlety and complexity which is exhibited by the workings of the modal verb âcanâ and its past tense form, âcouldâ; and also, I believe, by the mistaken conviction, on Dennettâs part, that any naturalistically respectable solution to the problem of free will would have to be of a compatibilist stripe. I shall attempt, in the second half of the paper, to explain what seems to me to be wrong with the framework, and to make some points about the functioning of âcanâ and âcouldâ, which I believe any adequate replacement for Dennettâs framework must respect. Ironically, though, I shall argue that it is the rejection of Dennettâs own framework which holds the key to understanding how to defend the spirit (if not the letter) of his thoughts about the invulnerability of our ordinary modal thinking to alleged threats from determinism
Bound States and the Special Composition Question
The Special Composition Question asks under what conditions a plurality of objects form another, composite object. We propose a condition grounded in our scientific knowledge of physical reality, the essence of which is that objects form a composite object when and only when they are in a bound state â whence our Bound State Proposal. We provide a variety of reasons in favour of a mereological theory that accommodates our Proposal. We consider but reject another proposal, which is quantum-physical in nature: the Entanglement Proposal. We close by responding to Tellerâs âSuit Objectionâ
The Invisible Thin Red Line
The aim of this paper is to argue that the adoption of an unrestricted principle of bivalence is compatible with a metaphysics that (i) denies that the future is real, (ii) adopts nomological indeterminism, and (iii) exploits a branching structure to provide a semantics for future contingent claims. To this end, we elaborate what we call Flow Fragmentalism, a view inspired by Kit Fine (2005)âs non-standard tense realism, according to which reality is divided up into maximally coherent collections of tensed facts. In this way, we show how to reconcile a genuinely A-theoretic branching-time model with the idea that there is a branch corresponding to the thin red line, that is, the branch that will turn out to be the actual future history of the world
The Replication Argument for Incompatibilism
In this paper, I articulate an argument for incompatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism. My argument comes in the form of an extended story, modeled loosely on Peter van Inwagenâs ârollback argumentâ scenario. I thus call it âthe replication argument.â As I aim to bring out, though the argument is inspired by so-called âmanipulationâ and âoriginal designâ arguments, the argument is not a version of either such argumentâand plausibly has advantages over both. The result, I believe, is a more convincing incompatibilist argument than those we have considered previously
Why compatibilist intuitions are not mistaken: a reply to Feltz and Millan
In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions. In a recent paper, Feltz and Millan (2015) have challenged this conclusion by claiming that most laypeople are only compatibilists in appearance and are in fact willing to attribute free will to people no matter what. As evidence for this claim, they have shown that an important proportion of laypeople still attribute free will to agents in fatalistic universes. In this paper, we first argue that Feltz and Millanâs error-theory rests on a conceptual confusion: it is perfectly acceptable for a certain brand of compatibilist to judge free will and fatalism to be compatible, as long as fatalism does not prevent agents from being the source of their actions. We then present the results of two studies showing that laypeopleâs intuitions are best understood as following a certain brand of source compatibilism rather than a âfree-will-no-matter-whatâ strategy
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